Abstract. We give a detailed account of the use of Q-curve reductions to construct elliptic curves over F p 2 with efficiently computable endomorphisms, which can be used to accelerate elliptic curve-based cryptosystems in the same way as Gallant-Lambert-Vanstone (GLV) and Galbraith-Lin-Scott (GLS) endomorphisms. Like GLS (which is a degenerate case of our construction), we offer the advantage over GLV of selecting from a much wider range of curves, and thus finding secure group orders when p is fixed for efficient implementation. Unlike GLS, we also offer the possibility of constructing twist-secure curves. We construct several one-parameter families of elliptic curves over F p 2 equipped with efficient endomorphisms for every p > 3, and exhibit examples of twist-secure curves over F p 2 for the efficient Mersenne prime p = 2 127 −1.
Introduction
Let E be an elliptic curve over a finite field F q , and let G ⊆ E(F q ) be a cyclic subgroup of prime order N . When implementing cryptographic protocols in G, the fundamental operation is scalar multiplication (or exponentiation):
Given P in G and m in Z, compute [m]P := P ⊕ · · · ⊕ P m times .
The literature on general scalar multiplication algorithms is vast, and we will not explore it in detail here (see [15, §2.8, §11.2] and [8, Chapter 9] for introductions to exponentiation and multiexponentiation algorithms). For our purposes, it suffices to note that the dominant factor in scalar multiplication time using conventional algorithms is the bitlength ⌈log 2 |m|⌉ of m. As a basic example, we may compute [m]P using a variant of the classic binary method, which requires at most ⌈log 2 |m|⌉ doublings and (in the worst case) about as many addings in G (in general, log 2 |m| ∼ log 2 N ∼ log 2 q).
Suppose E is equipped with an efficient F q -endomorphism ψ. By efficient, we mean that we can compute the image ψ(P ) of any point P in E(F q ) for the cost of O(1) operations in F q . In practice, we want this to cost no more than a few doublings in E(F q ).
Assume ψ(G) ⊆ G, or equivalently, that ψ restricts to an endomorphism of G.
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Now G is a finite cyclic group, isomorphic to Z/N Z, and every endomorphism of Z/N Z is just an integer multiplication modulo N . Hence, ψ acts on G as multiplication by some integer eigenvalue λ ψ : that is,
The eigenvalue λ ψ is a root of the characteristic polynomial of ψ in Z/N Z.
Returning to the problem of scalar multiplication: we want to compute [m]P . Rewriting m as m = a + bλ ψ (mod N )
for some a and b, we can compute [m]P using the relation
[m]P = [a]P ⊕ [bλ ψ ]P = [a]P ⊕ [b]ψ(P )
and a 2-dimensional multiexponentation such as Straus's algorithm [47] , which has a loop length of log 2 (a, b) ∞ : that is, log 2 (a, b) ∞ doubles and at most as many adds 2 (recall (a, b) ∞ = max(|a|, |b|)). If λ ψ is not too small, then we can easily find (a, b) such that log 2 (a, b) ∞ is roughly 1 2 log 2 N (we remove the "If" and the "roughly" for our ψ in §4.)
The endomorphism therefore lets us replace conventional log 2 N -bit scalar multiplications with ( 1 2 log 2 N )-bit multiexponentiations. In basic binary methods this means halving the loop length, cutting the number of doublings in half.
Of course, in practice we are not halving the execution time. The precise speedup depends on a variety of factors, including the choice of exponentiation and multiexponentiation algorithms, the cost of computing ψ, and the cost of doublings and addings in terms of bit operations-to say nothing of the cryptographic protocol, which may prohibit some other conventional speedups. For example: in [16] , Galbraith, Lin, and Scott report experiments where cryptographic operations on GLS curves required between 70% and 83% of the time required for the previous best practice curves-with the variation depending on the architecture, the underlying curve arithmetic, and the protocol in question.
To put this technique into practice, we need a source of cryptographic elliptic curves equipped with efficient endomorphisms. In the large characteristic case 3 , there are two archetypal constructions:
1. The classic Gallant-Lambert-Vanstone (GLV) construction [17] uses elliptic curves with explicit complex multiplication (CM) by quadratic orders with tiny discriminants. These curves can be found by reducing CM curves over number fields modulo suitable primes. 2. The more recent Galbraith-Lin-Scott (GLS) construction [16] . Here, curves over F p are viewed over F p 2 ; the p-power sub-Frobenius induces an extremely efficient endomorphism on the quadratic twist (which can have prime order).
GLV and GLS have been combined to give higher-dimensional variants on elliptic curves ( [29] , [50] ), and extended to hyperelliptic curves ( [4] , [27] , [41] , [48] ).
New endomorphisms from Q-curves. This work develops a new source of elliptic curves over F p 2 with efficient endomorphisms: quadratic Q-curves.
Definition 1.
A quadratic Q-curve of degree d is an elliptic curve E without CM, defined over a quadratic number field K, such that there exists an isogeny of degree d from E to its Galois conjugate σ E (formed by applying σ to the coefficients of the defining equation of E), where σ = Gal(K/Q).
Q-curves are well-established objects of interest in number theory, where they have formed a natural setting for generalizations of the Modularity Theorem. We recommend Ellenberg [12] for an excellent introduction to the theory.
Our application of quadratic Q-curves is somewhat more prosaic: given a d-isogeny E → σ E over a quadratic field, we reduce modulo an inert prime p to obtain an isogeny E → σ E over F p 2 . We then exploit the fact that the ppower Frobenius isogeny maps σ E back onto E; composing with the reduced d-isogeny, we obtain an endomorphism of E of degree dp. For efficiency, d must be small; happily, for small values of d, Hasegawa has written down universal one-parameter families of Q-curves [20] . We thus obtain one-parameter families of elliptic curves over F p 2 equipped with efficient non-integer endomorphisms.
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For concrete examples, we consider d = 2, 3, 5, and 7 in §5, §6, §7, and §8, respectively. We define our curves in short Weierstrass form for maximum generality and flexibility, but we also give isomorphisms to Montgomery, twisted Edwards, and Doche-Icart-Kohel models where appropriate.
Comparison with GLV. Like GLV, our method involves reducing curves defined over number fields to obtain curves over finite fields with explicit CM. However, we emphasise a profound difference: in our method, the curves over number fields generally do not have CM themselves.
GLV curves are necessarily isolated examples-and the really useful examples are extremely limited in number (cf. [29, App. A]). The scarcity of GLV curves is their Achilles' heel: as noted in [16] , if p is fixed then there is no guarantee that there will exist a GLV curve with prime (or almost-prime) order over F p . While we discuss this phenomenon further in §9, it is instructive to consider the example discussed in [16, §1] : the most efficient GLV curves have CM discriminants −3 and −4. If we are working at the 128-bit security level, then taking p = 2 255 − 19 allows particularly fast arithmetic in F p . But the largest prime factor of the order of a curve over F p with CM discriminant −4 (resp. −3) has 239 (resp. 230) bits: using these curves wastes 9 (resp. 13) potential bits of security. In fact, we are lucky with −3 and −4: for all of the other discriminants offering endomorphisms of degree at most 3, we can do no better than a 95-bit prime factor, which represents a catastrophic 80-bit loss of relative security.
In contrast, our construction yields true families of curves, covering ∼ p isomorphism classes over F p 2 for any choice of p. This gives us a vastly higher probability of finding secure curves over practically important fields.
Comparison with GLS. Like GLS, we construct curves over F p 2 equipped with an inseparable endomorphism. And like GLS, each of our families offer around p distinct isomorphism classes of curves, making it easy to find secure group orders when p is fixed.
But unlike GLS, our curves have j-invariants in F p 2 and not F p : they are not isomorphic to, or twists of, subfield curves. This allows us to find twist-secure curves: that is, curves with secure orders whose twists also have secure orders.
Twist-security is crucial in many elliptic curve-based protocols (including [23] , [24] , [5] , [31] , and [7] ); it is particularly important in modern x-coordinateonly ECDH implementations, such as Bernstein's Curve25519 software [2] (which anticipates the kind of fault attack detailed in [13] ). GLS curves cannot be used in any of these constructions.
As we will see, our construction degenerates to GLS when d = 1. Our construction is therefore a sort of generalized GLS-though it is not the higherdegree generalization anticipated by Galbraith, Lin, and Scott themselves, which composes a p-power sub-Frobenius endomorphism with a non-rational separable isogeny and its dual isogeny (cf. [16, Theorem 1] ).
Acknowledgements. The author thanks Charlotte Scribot, François Morain, and Craig Costello for their careful reading and suggestions.
Notation and Elementary Constructions
Throughout, we work over fields of characteristic not 2 or 3. Let
be an elliptic curve over such a field K.
Galois conjugates. For every automorphism σ of K, we have a conjugate curve
If φ : E 1 → E 2 is an isogeny, then we obtain a conjugate isogeny σ φ : σ E 1 → σ E 2 by applying σ to the defining equations of φ, E 1 , and E 2 . We write (p) for the p-th powering automorphism of F p . We note that (p) is trivial to compute on
Quadratic twists and twisted endomorphisms. For every nonzero λ in K, the quadratic twist of E by λ is the curve over K(λ 2 ) defined by
The twisting isomorphism δ(λ) :
Observe that δ(λ 1 )δ(λ 2 ) = δ(λ 1 λ 2 ) for any λ 1 , λ 2 ; and δ(−λ) = −δ(λ). For every K-endomorphism ψ of E, there is a twisted K(λ 2 )-endomorphism
It is important to distinguish conjugates (marked by left-superscripts) from twists (marked by right-superscripts); note that σ (E λ ) = ( σ E) σ λ for all λ and σ.
Quadratic twists over finite fields. If µ is a nonsquare in K = F q , then E √ µ is a quadratic twist of E. But E √ µ1 and E √ µ2 are F q -isomorphic for all nonsquares µ 1 and µ 2 in F q (the isomorphism δ( µ 1 /µ 2 ) is defined over F q because µ 1 /µ 2 must be a square); so, up to F q -isomorphism, it makes sense to speak of the quadratic twist. We let E ′ denote the quadratic twist when the choice of nonsquare is not important. Similarly, if ψ is an F q -endomorphism of E, then ψ ′ denotes the corresponding twisted F q -endomorphism of E ′ .
Traces and cardinalities. If K = F q , then π E denotes the q-power Frobenius endomorphism of E. The characteristic polynomial of π E has the form
the trace t E satisfies the Hasse bound
Explicit isogenies. Let S ⊂ E be a finite subgroup defined over K; Vélu's formulae ( [26, §2.4] , [49] ) compute the explicit (normalized) quotient isogeny
. We will need explicit formulae for the cases #S = 2, 3, 5, and 7. If S = {0, (α, 0)} has order 2, then
e−i (so F (x(P )) = 0 if and only if P is in S \ {0}); and then
and
Legendre symbols. The Legendre symbol n p is defined to be 1 if n is a square mod p, −1 if n is not a square mod p, and 0 if p divides n.
Reduced lattice bases. We work exclusively with the infinity norm · ∞ in this article. An ordered basis [e 1 , e 2 ] of a lattice in Z 2 is reduced if
a reduced basis has minimal length with respect to · ∞ (see [22] ).
Quadratic Q-curves and Their Reductions
Suppose E/Q( √ ∆) is a quadratic Q-curve of prime degree d (as in Definition 1), where ∆ is a discriminant prime to d, and let φ : E → σ E be the corresponding d-isogeny (where σ is the conjugation of Q( √ ∆) over Q). In general, φ is only defined over a quadratic extension Q(
, but we can always reduce to the case where γ = √ ±d (see [18, remark p. 385] ). Indeed, the Q-curves of degree d that we treat below all have γ = √ −d; so to simplify matters, from now on we will
Let p be a prime inert in Q( √ ∆) (equivalently, ∆ is not a square in F p ), of good reduction for E and prime to d. If O is the ring of integers of Q( √ ∆), then
Looking at the Galois groups of our fields, we have a series of injections
that is the image of (p): that is,
for all α, β, γ, and δ ∈ Q. Now let E/F p 2 be the reduction modulo p of E. The curve σ E reduces to (p) E, while the d-isogeny φ : E → σ E reduces to a d-isogeny φ : E → (p) E over F p 2 . Applying σ to φ, we obtain a second d-isogeny σ φ : σ E → E travelling in the opposite direction, which reduces mod p to a conjugate isogeny (p) φ : 
Technically, σ φ and (p) φ are-up to sign-the dual isogenies of φ and φ, respectively. The sign ǫ p depends on p: if τ is the extension of σ to Q(
Reducing modulo p, we see that
Composing π p with φ yields a degree-pd endomorphism
We also obtain an F p 2 -endomorphism ψ ′ on the quadratic twist E ′ . If d is very small-say, less than 10-then ψ and ψ ′ are efficient because φ is defined by polynomials of degree about d, and π p acts as a simple conjugation on coordinates in F p 2 , as in Eq. (7). Theorem 1. The endomorphisms ψ and ψ ′ satisfy
respectively. There exists an integer r satisfying
the characteristic polynomial of both ψ and ψ ′ is
Similarly, choosing a nonsquare µ in
The degree of ψ (and ψ ′ ) is dp, so both have a characteristic polynomial in the form P ψ (T ) = T 2 − aT + dp for some integer a. Hence, 
The curves E and E ′ are ordinary if and only if r = 0; and then
Proof. The curves E and E ′ are ordinary (not supersingular) if and only if p ∤ t E , if and only if p ∤ r (using Eq. (8) 
. The same holds for ψ ′ and π E ′ on E ′ . ⊓ ⊔ Equation (8) relates r to the orders of E and E ′ : we find
If E is supersingular, so r = 0, then [51, Theorem 1.1] yields a stronger statement:
, and hence [p] + ǫ p π is divisible by r in End(E): indeed, the quotient is ψ. The result follows on restricting to G; the argument for ψ ′ and G ′ is the same. ⊓ ⊔ Q-curves: Where from, and why? Now we just need a source of quadratic Qcurves of small degree. Elkies [11] shows that all Q-curves correspond to rational points on certain modular curves: 6 Let X * (d) be the quotient of the modular curve X 0 (d) by all of its Atkin-Lehner involutions. If e is a point in X * (d)(Q) and E is a preimage of e in
, where σ is the involution of Q( √ ∆)/Q. Luckily enough, for very small d, both X 0 (d) and X * (d) have genus zeroso not only can we get plenty of rational points on X * (d), we can get a whole one-parameter family of Q-curves of degree d. Hasegawa gives explicit universal curves for d = 2, 3, and 7 in [20, Theorem 2.2]: for each squarefree integer ∆ = 1, every Q-curve of degree d = 2, 3, 7 over Q( √ ∆) is Q-isomorphic to a rational specialization of one of these families.
Crucially, Hasegawa's families for d = 2, 3, and 7 are defined for any squarefree ∆; so we are free to start by fixing p, before choosing a ∆ to suit. Indeed, the particular choice of ∆ is theoretically irrelevant-since all quadratic extensions of F p are isomorphic-so we may choose any practically convenient value for ∆, such as one permitting faster arithmetic in
. Of course, one might ask why it is necessary to use this characteristic-zero theory when we could simply search for curves over F p 2 with a d-isogeny to their Galois conjugate. But for low degrees d where X 0 (d) has genus zero, every such curve arises as the reduction mod p of a Q-curve over Q( √ ∆) where ∆ is a nonsquare mod p. Indeed, the curves over F p 2 with d-isogenies to their Galois conjugates correspond (up to isomorphism) to points in
1 over the ground field in the cases we consider, so every such point lifts trivially to a point in
that is, to a Q-curve. We therefore lose no candidate curves over F p 2 by reducing Q-curves mod p instead of working directly over F p 2 . What we gain by working with Q-curves is some simplicity and universality in our proofs, to say nothing of the wealth of mathematical literature to be raided for examples and theorems. For example: instead of deriving and proving defining equations for these families over F p 2 , we can just conveniently borrow Hasegawa's universal Q-curve equations.
GLS as the degenerate case
, that E is defined over Q and base-extended to Q( √ ∆): then E = σ E, and we can apply our construction taking φ : E → σ E to be the identity map. Reducing 6 The reader unfamiliar with modular curves can get away with the following here: the modular curve X0(d) parametrizes isomorphism classes of (cyclic) d-isogenies. If d is prime-which is the only case we need here-then there is a unique Atkin-Lehner involution ω on X0(d): its action corresponds to exchanging isogenies φ with their duals
/ ω is a double cover, mapping (the isomorphism class of) an isogeny φ to the pair (of isomorphism classes) {φ, φ † }.
modulo an inert p, we have ψ = π p and ψ 2 = π 2 p = π E , so ψ has eigenvalue ±1 on cryptographic subgroups of E(F p 2 ): clearly, ψ is of no use to us for scalar decompositions. However, the twisted endomorphism 
Short Scalar Decompositions
Before moving on to concrete families and examples, we will show that the endomorphisms developed in §3 yield short scalar decompositions. 
Step 1 Let α := mb 22 /N and β := −mb 12 /N .
Step 2 Let c be the shortest of the four vectors ⌊α⌋b 1 + ⌊β⌋b 2 , ⌊α⌋b 1 + ⌈β⌉b 2 , ⌈α⌉b 1 + ⌊β⌋b 2 , and ⌈α⌉b 1 + ⌈β⌉b 2 .
7 Algorithm 1 differs from the standard technique (cf. [17, §4] ), based on Babai
Step 2. Instead of choosing c to be the shortest of the four vectors, Babai rounding approximates it by selecting c ′ = ⌊α⌉e1 + ⌊β⌉e2 (this is the correct choice for most m). In terms of bitlength, this means an excess of one bit in the worst case.
Step 3 Return (a, b) := (m, 0) − c.
Proof.
In either case, the bitlength of the reduced basis is ⌈log 2 (p + ǫ p )⌉.
Proof. Corollary (2) implies rλ ψ ≡ p + ǫ p and rǫ p d ≡ (p + ǫ p )λ ψ (mod N ), so e 1 and e 2 are in L; they are linearly independent, so they generate a sublattice. The determinant is (p + ǫ p ) 2 − ǫ p dr 2 , which is #E(F p 2 ) by Eq. (11) . Recall that r is in O( √ p) and d is very small, so e 1 ∞ = e 2 ∞ = p + ǫ p . Reducedness follows upon comparison with Ineq. (6) . ⊓ ⊔ 5 Endomorphisms from Quadratic Q-curves of Degree 2
Let ∆ be a squarefree integer. Hasegawa defines a one-parameter family
and s is a free parameter taking values in Q. Observe that σ E 2,∆,s = E 2,∆,−s .
To realise the Q-curve structure, observe that E 2,∆,s has a rational 2-torsion point (4, 0). We compute the normalized quotient isogeny E 2,∆,s → E 2,∆,s / (4, 0) using Eq. (2); but then we observe that E 2,∆,s / (4, 0) = ( σ E 2,∆,s ) √ −2 , so composing the quotient with the twisting isomorphism δ(1/ √ −2) yields a 2-isogeny
defined by the rational map
(The arbitrary choice of one of the two square roots of −2 results in an arbitrary sign on φ 2,∆,s .) Conjugating and composing again, we find that
-and similarly, φ 2,∆,s
The discriminant of the family E 2,∆,s is 2 9 · C 2,∆ (s) 2 · σ C 2,∆ (s), and
(letting s → ∞, we find j( E 2,∆,∞ ) = 1728). We see that E 2,∆,s reduces modulo any inert p > 3 to give a family of elliptic curves over F p 2 , and then every value of s in F p yields an elliptic curve over F p 2 . (Proposition 1 below shows that at most two of these curves are isomorphic.) Theorem 2. Let p > 3 be prime, fix a nonsquare ∆ modulo p, so F p 2 = F p ( √ ∆), and let E 2,∆,s and φ 2,∆,s be the reductions modulo p of E 2,∆,s and φ 2,∆,s .
For each s in F p , the curve E 2,∆,s /F p 2 has an efficient F p 2 -endomorphism
, where
There exists an integer r satisfying 2r 2 = 2p + ǫ p t E2,∆,s such that
; the characteristic polynomial of ψ 2,∆,s and ψ ′ 2,∆,s is P 2,∆,s (T ) = T 2 − 2rT + 2p. In particular, if E 2,∆,s is ordinary and G ⊆ E 2,∆,s (F p 2 ) is a cyclic subgroup of order N such that ψ 2,∆,s (G) ⊆ G, then the eigenvalue of ψ 2,∆,s on G is
Proof. Apply Theorem 1 and Corollary 2 to φ 2,∆,s using Eq. (12) .
is a square in F p , and p − 1 otherwise.
Proof. If j(E 2,∆,s1 ) = j(E 2,∆,s2 ) with s 1 = s 2 , then F 0 (s 1 , s 2 ) = 2 √ ∆F 1 (s 1 , s 2 ), where the polynomials Optimal decompositions. In view of the Pohlig-Hellman-Silver reduction [35] and the rational 2-torsion point on E 2,∆,s , the "optimal" situation for discretelog based cryptosystems is when E 2,∆,s (F p 2 ) ∼ = Z/2Z× G with #G prime (though for faster arithmetic, we may want a cofactor of 4 instead of 2; we consider this later). Lemma 2 constructs an optimal basis for the GLV lattice L in this case. We can use this basis in Algorithm 1 to decompose scalar multiplications in G as In either case, the bitlength of the reduced basis is ⌈log 2 (p + ǫ p − |r|)⌉.
Proof. Let L 0 := e 1 , e 2 with e 1 := (p + ǫ p , −r) and e 2 := (−ǫ p 2r, p + ǫ p ) as in Lemma 1; then [L : L 0 ] = 2, so exactly one of e 1 /2, e 2 /2, or (e 1 + e 2 )/2 is in L. Equation (11) shows that 2N = (p + ǫ p ) 2 − 2ǫ p r 2 with |r| < √ 2p; since N is odd, r must also be odd, so e 2 /2 is in Z 2 but e 1 /2 and (e 1 + e 2 )/2 are not-and hence they cannot be in L, either. We conclude that L = e 1 , e 2 /2 . Inequality (6) 
an implementation of fast scalar multiplication using ψ M 2,∆,s is detailed in [9] .
Twisted Edwards models. Every Montgomery model corresponds to a twisted
Edwards model, and vice versa (cf. [3] and [21] In each case, the bitlength of the reduced basis is ⌈log 2 (p + ǫ p )⌉ − 1.
Proof. The sublattice L 0 = e 1 , e 2 has index 4 in L. Equation (11) implies (p + ǫ p ) 2 ≡ 2ǫ p r 2 (mod 4), and since p + ǫ p is even, r must be even as well; so we can replace the relation ǫ p rλ 2,∆,s ≡ p + ǫ p with ǫ p (r/2)λ 2,∆,s ≡ (p + ǫ p )/2 (mod N ). Hence, both e 1 /2 and e 2 /2 are in L; so they must form a basis for L. The listed bases are combinations of e 1 /2 and e 2 /2 satisfying Ineq. (6), and are therefore reduced. The longest vector in each basis has length (p + ǫ p )/2.
⊓ ⊔ Doche-Icart-Kohel models. Doubling-oriented Doche-Icart-Kohel models are defined by equations of the form y 2 = x(x 2 + Dx + 16D). These curves have a rational 2-isogeny φ with kernel (0, 0) , and both φ and its dual φ † are in a special form that allows marginally faster doubling using the factorization [2] = φ † φ (see [10, §3.1] for details). Our curves E 2,∆,s come equipped with a rational 2-isogeny, so it is natural to try putting them in Doche-Icart-Kohel form. We have an isomorphism from E 2,∆,s to the Doche-Icart-Kohel model
6 Endomorphisms from Quadratic Q-curves of Degree 3
and s is a free parameter taking values in Q. Observe that σ E 3,∆,s = E 3,∆,−s . To realize the degree-3 Q-curve structure, note that x − 3 defines an order-3 subgroup S = {0, (3,
Computing the normalized quotient isogeny E 3,∆,s → E 3,∆,s /S using Eqs. (3), (4), and (5), we observe that
; so composing the quotient with δ(1/ √ −3) yields an explicit 3-isogeny φ 3,∆,s : E 3,∆,s → σ E 3,∆,s defined by the rational map
Conjugating and composing again, we see that
(and similarly, φ 3,∆,s
This family has discriminant 2
(letting s → ∞, we see that j( E 3,∆,∞ ) = 0). Hence, E 3,∆,s reduces modulo any inert p > 3 to give a family of elliptic curves over F p 2 , and then every value of s in F p yields an elliptic curve over F p 2 . A calculation similar to Proposition 1 shows that we get at least p − 8 non-isomorphic curves in this way.
, and let E 3,∆,s and φ 3,∆,s be the reductions modulo p of E 3,∆,s and φ 3,∆,s .
For each s in F p , the curve E 3,∆,s /F p 2 has an efficient F p 2 -endomorphism
There exists an integer r satisfying 3r 2 = 2p + ǫ p t E3,∆,s such that
the characteristic polynomial of ψ 3,∆,s and ψ ′ 3,∆,s is P 3,∆,s (T ) = T 2 − 3rT + 3p. In particular, if E 3,∆,s is ordinary and G ⊆ E 3,∆,s (F p 2 ) is a cyclic subgroup of order N such that ψ 3,∆,s (G) ⊆ G, then the eigenvalue of ψ 3,∆,s on G is
Proof. Follows from Theorem 1 and Corollary 2 using Eq. (13) .
⊓ ⊔ Optimal decompositions. The kernel of ψ 3,∆,s is generated by the rational points (3, ± σ C 3,∆ (s)), so #E 3,∆,s (F p 2 ) is always divisible by 3. However, the nontrivial points in the kernel of the twisted endomorphism ψ ′ 3,∆,s are not defined over F p 2 (they are conjugates), so it is possible for E ′ 3,∆,s (F p 2 ) to have prime order. From the point of view of the Pohlig-Hellman-Silver reduction, the "most secure" curves in E 3,∆,s /F p 2 have E 3,∆,s (F p 2 ) ∼ = Z/3Z × G, with G of prime order. Lemma 4 gives an optimal basis for the GLV lattice L in this case (for a prime-order twist, the basis of Lemma 1 is already optimal).
In either case, the bitlength of the reduced basis is ⌈log 2 (p + ǫ p − 2|r|)⌉.
Proof. The proof is essentially the same as for Lemma 2, with 3 in place of 2.
The sublattice e 1 , e 2 has index 3 in L, so exactly one of
3 (e 1 + e 2 ), and
On the other hand, 3 ∤ r (since otherwise 3 | N ), so neither 
. This is an
7 Endomorphisms from Quadratic Q-curves of Degree 5
For d = 5, Hasegawa notes that it is impossible to give a universal Q-curve for arbitrary squarefree ∆: there exists a quadratic Q-curve of degree 5 over Q( √ ∆) if and only if 5 p i = 1 for every prime p i = 5 dividing ∆ (see [20, Proposition 2.3] ). This restricts our choice of ∆ for a given p.
The special case ∆ = −1 is particularly interesting: by the above, there exists a family of Q-curves of degree 5 over Q( √ −1), and every prime p ≡ 3 (mod 4) is inert in Q( √ −1). We work this case out in detail below. The remaining case p ≡ 1 (mod 4) is a straightforward exercise: given a fixed prime p > 5, we choose a squarefree ∆ meeting the condition above, then apply [20, Theorem 2.4 ] to derive a family of degree-5 Q-curves over Q( √ ∆) amenable to the construction of §3.
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Of course, compared with d = 2 and 3, endomorphisms with separable degree d = 5 are intrinsically slower. The chief interest of this family is that unlike with d = 2 and 3, here neither the generic curve nor its twist have rational torsion points, so it is possible for reductions and their twists to both have prime order.
Let E 5,−1,s be the family of elliptic curves over Q( √ −1) defined by
where
and s is a free parameter taking values in Q.
The family E 5,−1,s is a family of Q-curves of degree 5: the polynomial 
The family has discriminant −2 6 3 12 s 3 (11s − 2) 3 (1 + s 2 )(1 + s √ −1) 4 , and
Hence, E 5,−1,s is an elliptic curve for all s in Q \ {0, 2/11}, and these E 5,−1,s have good reduction at any p > 5 inert in Q( √ −1). The analogue of Proposition 1 shows that we get at least p − 25 non-isomorphic curves in this way.
Theorem 4. Let p be a prime congruent to 3 modulo 4, so F p 2 = F p ( √ −1), and let E 5,−1,s and φ 5,−1,s be the reductions mod p of E 5,−1,s and φ 5,−1,s . 10 In [44] , the author suggested that for any p ≡ 1 (mod 4) one could use ∆ = −11 with
Hasegawa's parameters in [20, Table 6 ] in the construction of §3. This is incorrect: half of the p ≡ 1 (mod 4) are not inert in Q( √ −11).
For each s = 0 or 2/11 in F p , the curve E 5,−1,s /F p 2 has an efficient F p 2 -endomorphism
of degree 5p such that ψ 
Endomorphisms from Quadratic Q-curves of Degree 7
For completeness, we include a family of Q-curves of degree 7. These curves are less interesting for practical applications, since the higher degree renders the endomorphism intrinsically slower than the curves with d = 2, 3, and 5.
and s is a free parameter taking values in Q. Observe that σ E 7,∆,s = E 7,∆,−s .
The family E 7,∆,s is a family of quadratic Q-curves of degree 7. More explicitly: E 7,∆,s has a subgroup S of order 7 defined by the kernel polynomial
While S is defined over Q( √ ∆), none of its nontrivial points are. Computing the normalized quotient E 7,∆,s → E 7,∆,s /S (using Eqs. (3), (4) , and (5)) and composing with the twisting isomorphism δ(1/ √ −7) yields an explicit 7-isogeny φ 7,∆,s : E 7,∆,s → E 7,∆,s . Conjugating and composing again, we see that
(and similarly, φ 7,∆,s
The discriminant of E 7,∆,s is 2 6 , and
(letting s → ∞, we find j( E 7,∆,∞ ) = −3375); so E 7,∆,s reduces modulo any inert p > 7 to give a family of elliptic curves E 7,∆,s /F p 2 , and then any value of s in F p such that s 2 = −27/∆ yields an elliptic curve over F p 2 . A calculation similar to Proposition 1 shows that we get at least p − 48 non-isomorphic curves in this way, when p is sufficiently large.
Theorem 5. Let p > 7 be prime, fix a nonsquare ∆ modulo p, so F p 2 = F p ( √ ∆), and let E 7,∆,s and φ 7,∆,s be the reductions modulo p of E 7,∆,s and φ 7,∆,s .
For each s in F p such that s 2 = −27/∆, the curve E 7,∆,s /F p 2 has an efficient
There exists an integer r satisfying 7r 2 = 2p + ǫ p t E7,∆,s such that
the characteristic polynomial of ψ 7,∆,s and ψ ′ 7,∆,s is P 7,∆,s (T ) = T 2 − 7rT + 7p. In particular, if E 7,∆,s is ordinary and G ⊆ E 7,∆,s (F p 2 ) is a cyclic subgroup of order N such that ψ 7,∆,s (G) ⊆ G, then the eigenvalue of ψ 7,∆,s on G is
Proof. Follows from Theorem 1 and Corollary 2 using Eq. (15) .
⊓ ⊔ By definition, Q-curves do not have CM. However, if E s is a family of Q-curves then some isolated curves in E s may have CM. These exceptional curves are of interest for 4-dimensional scalar decompositions: they form a natural generalization of the GLV+GLS curves described by Longa and Sica [29] . Briefly: if E/Q( √ ∆) has CM by an order of small discriminant, then we can compute an explicit endomorphismρ of E of small degree (using Stark's algorithm [46] , say), which then yields an efficient endomorphism ρ on the reduction E of E modulo p, exactly as in the GLV construction. If E is d-isogenous to σ E and p is inert in Q( √ ∆), then E also has the degree-dp endomorphism ψ constructed in §3. The endomorphisms [1] , ρ, ψ, and ρψ may then be used as a basis for the 4-dimensional decomposition techniques elaborated in [29] .
Practical limitations of 4-dimensional decompositions. "Q-curves with CM" inherit the chief drawback of the GLV construction: as noted in §1, we cannot hope to find secure (and twist-secure) curves when p is fixed. This scarcity of secure curves is easily explained: reductions of CM endomorphisms (including GLV endomorphisms) are separable, and efficient separable endomorphisms have extremely small degree, so that their dense defining polynomials can be evaluated quickly. But the degree of an endomorphism is the norm of the corresponding CM-order element; and to have non-integers of very small norm, the CM-order must have a tiny discriminant. Up to twists, the number of elliptic curves with CM discriminant −D is the class number h(−D) (which is asymptotically in O( √ D)). The six orders containing endomorphisms of degree ≤ 3 have class number 1, and hence only one corresponding j-invariant. For −D = −4, corresponding to j = 1728, there are two or four F p 2 -isomorphism classes; for −D = −3, corresponding to j = 0, we have two or six; and otherwise we have only two. In particular, there are at most 18 pairwise non-isomorphic curves over F p 2 with a nontrivial endomorphism of degree at most 3.
Over a fixed finite field, the probability that any of these curves will have a secure group order, let alone be twist-secure, is very low: roughly speaking, we expect to try O(log 2 p) random curves over F p 2 before finding a twist-secure one (see [40] , for example, for more accurate heuristics). In practice, then, we cannot use these curves when p is fixed for efficiency. Higher-dimensional scalar decomposition speedups therefore come at the cost of suboptimal field arithmetic: we pay for shorter loop lengths with comparatively slower field (and hence group) operations, to say nothing of a more complicated multiexponentiation algorithm.
We must therefore choose between 4-dimensional decompositions and faster underlying field arithmetic. Here we have chosen the latter, so we do not treat CM curves in depth. However, we enumerate the exceptional CM curves in our families in Theorem 6, to provide a convenient source of curves for readers interested in exploring and implementing 4-dimensional techniques.
Exceptional CM curves. Any one-dimensional family of Q-curves has only finitely many exceptional CM curves, up to isomorphism, and it is easy to compute them. 
